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INTRODUCTION 
Kelley brought this action seeking a declaratory judg-
mer f :;he parties' respective xiyhLw and \ih 1 :i .'|.il ion1- u• u.1*•! m\ 
agreement (the " Agreement* i ana specific 
performance of the Agreement The trial court granted specific 
performance, the parties set.I It** I I hi t eitidlni ug issues, unci h i.i"st 
Security accepted Kelley" s money and gave Kelley deeds to the 
property See R, 815-24. The only issue or appeal was whether 
Kelley's tender of perfc : • -..--. :-xeby precluding 
specific performance. 
REPLY TO LEUCADIA'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Certain portions of Leucadia's statement of fact :» die 
r nr misleading: 
Par ^eucadia's statement of facts paraphrases 
certain terms ' • - areement. Obi 10 isl< I he Agreement speaks 
for Itsel f extent that Leucadia's paraphrases misstate 
the terms t the Agreement, they should be ignored or stricken.* 
See Utah : . ,.. * . 
1
 F o r e x a m p X e # Leucadia claims that the Agreement was 
"conditioned on" First Security furnishing good and marketable 
title to the Property. In fact, the provision with respect to 
the "Condition and Conveyance of Title" makes the obligation 
"to furnish good and marketable title" a covenant and not a con-
dition. R. 185. ££. Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1232-33 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (the law overwhelmingly favors the construc-
tion of ambiguous contract provisions as covenants as opposed 
to conditions precedent). 
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Leucadia states that both Kelley and First Security 
understood that the property was enclosed "by fences, a stream, 
a spring and a pond," and that, as a result of the erroneous 
property description, the boundaries shifted so that "neither 
the spring, the stream, nor the pond" would be included in the 
conveyance. In fact, the pond was not part of the boundary 
problem. It was in front of the house and was not affected by 
the shift in boundaries. See R. 143, 194-96, 258-59 & 276. Thus, 
this is not simply a case of a title defect. There were several 
problems with the property—the boundary problem, the question 
of water rights, and damage to property that was clearly part 
of the Agreement regardless of the location of the boundaries. 
Leucadia claims that ,f[i]t became clear" that the ad-
jacent land owners (the Armstrongs) would not resolve these pro-
blems without substantial litigation and that First Security 
told Kelley that "resolution of the boundary dispute and property 
damage could not be done through negotiation." It cites to First 
Security's September 4, 1987, letter for both of these proposi-
tions. That letter does not say that the problems cannot be 
resolved through negotiation or without substantial litigation. 
Rather, it simply states that "First Security is no longer 
desirous of pursuing the lawsuit with the Armstrongs" and claims 
that "First Security has never viewed itself as having the ob-
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ligation to clear title, nor does the earnest money agreement 
provide for that obligation." R. 115. 
Leucadia states that, "[a]t Kelley's request, the 
closing date was extended until September 22, 1987." Although 
Kelley requested more time to close, he did not set the date of 
September 22, 1987. First Security did. And it was untraversed 
that, under the circumstances, September 22 provided an unreason-
ably short time for Kelley to close. See R. 278-80. 
Leucadia claims that, on September 22, 1987, Kelley 
"declined to close under either of the agreed-upon options 
. . . required by the Agreement" and instead tendered his payment 
"conditioned on First Security resolving the boundary dispute, 
rectifying the property damage, and clearing title prior to 
closing." In fact, the letter of Kelley's counsel clearly 
states, "This tender is conditioned only upon First Security 
honoring its obligations pursuant to the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement and delivering the property free from those defects 
which it has undertaken to cure." R. 120. Kelley and First 
Security clearly differed as to whether First Security had an 
obligation to resolve the problems with the property. That is 
why Kelley had to file this action. It was for the court, not 
First Security, to say what First Security's obligations were 
under the Agreement and what Kelley's options were. 
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Leucadia claims that First Security offered to extend 
the closing date to October 8, 1987, if Kelley would purchase 
the property "as is."2 What Leucadia does not say is that First 
Security's "as is" did not mean that First Security would give 
Kelley the property in the condition it was in when the Agreement 
was made but in the condition it was in in September 1987, that 
is, with the water cut off, the pond dry and the fish gone, even 
though all the damage to the property occurred at a time when 
First Security bore all risk of loss due to vandalism.3 See R. 
17 5 P. Leucadia also fails to say that even after Kelley de-
clined this offer First Security continued to treat the Agreement 
as in effect. See, e.g., R. 283. 
Leucadia claims that First Security executed a release 
of Kelley's earnest money deposit on September 24, 1987. The 
release, however, was expressly conditioned on Kelley's agree-
ment to the release, and Kelley did not agree. R. 125. 
Leucadia states that it entered into a binding Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement with First Security on November 2, 1987, 
2 Leucadia neglects to mention that First Security's 
offer was also conditioned on Kelley giving First Security a 
complete release of all claims he may have had against it. See 
Deposition of Wayne L. Lantz (R. 911) at 128. 
3 First Security's definition of "as is" also extended 
to the condition of title, R. 117, negating First Security's 
contractual obligation to convey good and marketable title by 
special warranty deed. See R. 185. The Utah Court of Appeals 
has since rejected such a construction of "as is." See Breuer-
Harrison. Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 727 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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and that, on November 25, 1987, the property was sold to Leucadia. 
It neglects to mention, however, that the sale was made subject 
to the lis pendens that Kelley filed, placing Leucadia on notice 
of this action and Kelleyfs claim to the property. R. 33l.4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Leucadia does not dispute that Kelley had until 
September 22, 1987, to tender his performance. E.g., Brief of 
Respondent at 9, 33, 35. Nor does Leucadia dispute that Kelley 
tendered his performance on September 22, 1987. id. at 25, 33. 
Leucadia claims, however, that Kelley's tender was defective 
because he refused to waive title defects and insisted that First 
Security resolve the issues of title defects and water rights 
before closing. 
Leucadia's arguments ignore the context in which 
Kelley's tender was made. The parties to a contract had a good-
faith dispute over their respective rights and obligations under 
the contract. Kelley had the right to ask a court to resolve 
the dispute. By doing so, he did not lose his right to specific 
performance. (Point I.) 
4
 Any suggestion that Leucadia was somehow injured by 
the court's decree of specific performance is put to rest by 
the terms of Leucadia's contract with First Security, which pro-
vided that Leucadia would take the property subject to Kelley's 
lawsuit and required First Security to indemnify Leucadia com-
pletely and return its money with interest (at the prime rate) 
if Kelley was successful. See R. 510-14. 
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Moreover, Kelley's tender was not defective. Kelley 
was not required to waive title defects by September 22, 1987, 
so his alleged failure to waive defects did not make his tender 
defective (point II). Any condition imposed on his tender did 
not make the tender defective (point III). Even under Leucadia's 
position, Kelly's tender was timely (point V). If Kelley's tender 
were untimely or defective, any defect is irrelevant because 
his tender was excused (point IV). 
Finally, even if the court of appeals were otherwise 
correct, it erred by directing entry of judgment in favor of 
Leucadia (point VI). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
LEUCADIA HAS ERRED BY FOCUSING EXCLUSIVELY ON 
KELLEY'S TENDER LETTER, WHICH IT HAS TAKEN OUT 
OF CONTEXT, 
Leucadia does not dispute that Kelley tendered his 
performance. See, e.g., Brief of Respondent at 25, 33. It claims 
only that Kelley's tender was defective because it was conditional 
on First Security providing a remedy not required by the Agree-
ment. 
All of Leucadiars arguments are based on Kelley's tender 
letter of September 22, 1987. That letter stated: 
This tender is conditioned only upon First 
Security honoring its obligations pursuant 
to the Earnest Money Sales Agreement and 
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delivering the property free from those de-
fects which it has undertaken to cure. Mr. 
Kelley further requests that First Security 
resolve the issue regarding the water rights 
to the pond immediately in front of the home. 
R. 61. 
The main problem with Leucadia's arguments is their 
tunnel vision. They focus solely on this provision of the letter 
and ignore, not only all of Kelley's other actions, but also 
First Security's actions that prompted the letter. Leucadia 
stands in the shoes of First Security and cannot have any better 
rights than First Security would have. Yet it has tried to dis-
tance itself from First Security's actions. The September 22 
tender letter must be read in context, and, so read, it was an 
appropriate response to First Security's actions. 
The parties had originally agreed to close the sale 
on April 20, 1987.5 However, before April 20 First Security had 
discovered a boundary error, which it undertook to cure by filing 
a quiet title action against the neighboring landowners, the 
Armstrongs. See R. 23-36. Kelley and First Security agreed to 
three extensions of the closing date—twice after the agreed 
dates had expired—while First Security tried to remedy the prob-
lem. R. 19-21. In the meantime, the Armstrongs tore out water 
lines and cut off water to the property, causing the main pond 
5 Leucadia states that the parties extended the closing 
date to April 20, 1987. Brief of Respondent at 4-5. In fact, 
that was the original closing date. See R. 18. 
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to dry up. R. 31, 45, 50-52. Throughout this period, First 
Security assured Kelley, who lived in Massachusetts, that it 
was taking care of the problems and that he did not need to hire 
an attorney. R. 289. 
About the time the last extension was to expire, Leu-
cadia entered the picture. It offered to purchase the property 
for more money, see R. 493, giving First Security a better deal 
than it had with Kelley and an easy way out of the lawsuit it 
had started to clear title. So on September 4, 1987, when Kelley 
was expecting the usual thirty-day extension, First Security 
wrote Kelley to say that he had until September 15 either to 
close or to "walk away from the deal." R. 115. First Security 
did not say that title to the property could not be insured.** 
Nor did First Security say that it had done all it could reason-
ably be expected to do to try to clear title and had been unable 
to do so. Rather, First Security claimed it had "never viewed 
itself as having the obligation to clear title" and said it was 
simply "no longer desirous of pursuing the lawsuit with the Arm-
strongs." R. 115. First Security recognized that Kelley needed 
to review the legal issues involved "to make a fully informed 
judgment." It encouraged Kelley to obtain legal counsel and 
offered to cooperate with Kelley's chosen counsel* R. 115. 
6 In fact, at the time the trial court entered its Partial 
Summary Judgment, R. 562, there was not even any evidence in 
the record of a preliminary commitment for title insurance. 
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In response to this letter, Kelley wired back, "Will 
not walk away. Based on history, need normal 30-day extension." 
R. 294. Kelley also retained counsel, who made an appointment 
with First Security's counsel to review the documents concerning 
the boundary and water problems, but First Security's counsel 
failed to keep the appointment. In fact, First Security did 
not provide Kelley with all the necessary documents until October 
15, 1987. R. 283. 
Because Kelley did not even receive First Security's 
September 4 letter until September 8, First Security extended 
its deadline to September 22, 1987. R. 117-18. At that time, 
Kelley had not seen any closing documents, had not been given 
the information necessary to evaluate the boundary and water 
problems and only knew that First Security claimed it had no 
obligation under the Agreement to try to remedy the problems.' 
Under these circumstances, Kelley did the only thing 
he could do. On September 22, 1987, First Security's unilaterally 
imposed deadline, Kelley tendered his performance, "conditioned 
7
 First Security was also claiming that it would sell 
the property to Kelley "'as is' without warranty." R. 114, yet, 
even under First Security's definition of "as is," see supra, 
note 3, it was clear that First Security was not prepared to 
give Kelley the property in the condition it was in at the time 
the Agreement was made. At the time the Agreement was made, 
the property included a full trout pond. By September 22, 1987, 
the water to the pond had been cut off, and the pond had been 
emptied. See R. 50-52, 61. 
- 9 -
only on First Security honoring its obligations pursuant to the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement," R. 61, and he filed this action, 
Leucadia now argues that, by asking First Security to 
clear title, as it had undertaken to do, Kelley somehow lost 
his right to buy the property. All the evidence shows that Kelley 
wanted to buy the property and refused to walk away from the 
deal. The evidence also shows that Kelley refused to accept 
First Security's unsupported assertion that it had no obligation 
to try to clear title or correct the problems relating to water 
rights and vandalism. 
What this case comes down to is a dispute between the 
parties to a contract over their respective rights and obligations 
under the contract.8 It is undisputed that Kelley timely tendered 
his performance, "conditioned only upon First Security honoring 
y
 The Agreement was essentially a form contract, the 
relevant provisions of which had never been interpreted by Utah 
appellate courts. Leucadia claims that the parties "bargained 
for" its terms. Brief of Respondent at 5. With the exception 
of the provision that the property was to be sold ,f/as is' without 
warranty" and the provision requiring a current certified survey 
of the property, all of the terms Leucadia cites were part of a 
preprinted, standard form earnest money sales agreement approved 
by the Utah Real Estate Commission. The implication that, at 
the time they entered into the Agreement, the parties considered 
the problems that later arose and "bargained for" the remedies 
Leucadia claims are exclusive is belied by the testimony of Wayne 
L. Lantz, who negotiated the deal on behalf of First Security. 
Mr. Lantz testified that, had the parties "known of the ambiguity 
in the property description, we would not have signed the Earnest 
Money Agreement without specifically addressing that issue and 
thereby ensuring that Mr. Kelley understood that he was taking 
the property subject to the ambiguity in the description." R. 
686 I 10. 
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its obligations pursuant to the [Agreement] and delivering the 
property free from those defects which it has undertaken to cure." 
R. 61. First Security claimed it had no such obligation. Kelley 
thought it did. Consequently, he filed this action to ask the 
court to declare the parties' respective rights and obligations 
under the Agreement and to enforce the Agreement according to 
its terms.^ By filing this action, Kelley made an irrevocable 
election to enforce the Agreement. See Salt Lake City v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 81 Utah 213, 220-21, 17 P.2d 239, 242-43 (1932); 
Cook v. Covev-Ballard Motor Co., 69 Utah 161, 169, 253 P. 196 
(1927); Howard v. J.P. Paulson Co., 41 Utah 490, 495, 127 P. 284 
(1912). He paid his money into court and had no right to get 
it back.10 If Kelley was not entitled both to specific perfor-
mance and to the other relief he sought, then the appropriate 
response would have been to deny Kelley the other relief. But 
y
 Leucadia claims that Kelley requested "an order of 
the Court that First Security was obligated to resolve the boun-
dary dispute, repair or replace the property, and then convey 
the property to Kelley," Brief of Respondent at 10 (emphasis 
added), suggesting that Kelley would not take the property with 
the problems unresolved. In fact, Kelley's Complaint asked for 
a judgment interpreting the Agreement, R. 6-7, and "a decree of 
specific performance requiring First Security to convey the 
Subject Property to him as contracted in the [Agreement] as in-
terpreted by the Court's Order." R. 7-8 (emphasis added). 
Clearly, if the court held that First Security had no obligation 
to remedy the problems
 f Kelley would have to take the property 
with the problems unresolved. 
10 Thus, First Security suffered no damage as a result 
of Kelley's filing this action. 
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the parties settled their remaining claims, thereby mooting that 
issue. 
Nevertheless, Leucadia would have this Court hold that, 
by asking a court to resolve the dispute, Kelley lost his right 
to enforce the Agreement. That has never been the law of this 
state, and the Court should not make it so now. 
II. 
KELLEY WAS NOT REQUIRED TO WAIVE TITLE DEFECTS 
BEFORE TENDERING HIS PERFORMANCE. 
Leucadia argues that Kelley's refusal to waive claims 
regarding title defects and property damage in his September 
22, 1987, tender letter, caused the Agreement to terminate by 
its own terms. Leucadia relies primarily on paragraph H of the 
Agreement, regarding title insurance.^ That paragraph states: 
If title insurance is elected, Seller author-
izes the Listing Brokerage to order a pre-
liminary commitment for a standard form ALTA 
policy of title insurance to be issued by 
such title insurance company as Seller shall 
designate. Title policy to be issued shall 
contain no exceptions other than those pro-
vided for in said standard form, and the en-
cumbrances or defects excepted under the 
final contract of sale. If title cannot be 
made so insurable through an escrow agreement 
at closing, the earnest money shall, unless 
Buyer elects to waive such defects or en-
1 1
 Leucadia also mentions paragraph G. However, as the 
court of appeals correctly noted, paragraph G does not require 
the buyer to waive title defects. It merely gives him the option 
of terminating the agreement, and "Kelley refused to accept this 
option." Slip op. at 3. 
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cumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this 
Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. 
Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge. 
R. 15. 
Paragraph H was obviously meant for the buyer's benefit. 
If the buyer cannot obtain title insurance, paragraph H gives 
the buyer the option of waiving unexcepted defects and encum-
brances or getting his earnest money back. The question is, 
When was Kelley required to make that election? 
Under the terms of paragraph H, Kelley's alleged obli-
gation to waive title defects or walk away from the deal could 
not even arise until there had been a preliminary commitment 
for title insurance that contained exceptions other than those 
provided for in a standard form ALTA title insurance policy. 
First Security introduced no evidence in the trial court of any 
preliminary commitment for title insurance, let alone a standard 
form ALTA policy, because it never claimed that paragraph H pre-
cluded Kelley's claim for specific performance. Because there 
was no evidence that paragraph H even applied, the trial court 
properly ignored paragraph H in holding that Kelley was entitled 
to specific performance.^ 
*2 Leucadia has not disputed the fact that there was never 
any showing—either before or after this action was filed—that 
any of the conditions precedent to Kelley's obligation to elect 
his remedy under paragraph H had been met. It simply claims 
that there was "no factual issue in that regard." Brief of 
Respondent at 40. That is because First Security, whose burden 
it was to prove that paragraph H applied, did not even argue 
- 13 -
Even if Kelley were required to waive defects under 
paragraph H or walk away from the deal, Kelley was not required 
to make his election before September 22, 1987, when he elected 
to enforce the Agreement by filing this action. 
Leucadia claims that First Security's letter of 
September 4, 1987, triggered Kelley's duty to elect under para-
graph H.13 BUt that argument ignores the terms of that letter. 
First Security did not claim that its obligations were excused 
under paragraph H.^^ It did not claim that it had tried to obtain 
a title insurance policy and that no policy could be issued with-
out the standard exceptions. Nor did it claim that it had exer-
cised reasonable diligence to clear title and had been unable 
to do so. It simply said it was "no longer desirous" of pursuing 
the actions it had already undertaken to correct the problems 
that paragraph H applied, let alone introduce any evidence to show 
that it applied. 
1J
 At one point, Leucadia suggests that Kelley was re-
quired to make an election once the title defects became known. 
Brief of Respondent at 26. But First Security's own actions 
belie this argument, since it waited more than four months after 
first discovering the problems and extended the closing date 
three times before it ever claimed that Kelley was required to 
close. 
14 The only contract provision First Security even men-
tioned was the provision that the property was "sold 'as is' 
without warranty." Leucadia has not disputed that, as Kelley 
has shown, that provision referred to the physical condition or 
habitability of the property and not to any warranties of title. 
Compare Brief of Petitioner at 26-28, with Brief of Respondent 
at 30. 
. 14 -
with the property and that it "never viewed itself as having 
the obligation to clear title." R. 114-15. That was insufficient 
to trigger Kelley's election of remedy under paragraph H. 
Moreover, under any construction of paragraph H, Kelley 
was entitled to a reasonable time to evaluate his options and 
elect his remedy. The undisputed evidence showed that First 
Security's unilateral deadline of September 22, 1987, did not 
provide Kelley a reasonable time to make an informed decision. 
See infra pt. V. 
But even if Kelley were required to waive title defects 
or walk away from the deal by September 22, 1987, as Leucadia 
claims, the evidence shows that Kelley unequivocally refused to 
walk away from the deal. Kelley responded to First Security's 
letter with a mailgram stating, "Will not walk away." R. 294. 
He did not accept First Security's offer to return his earnest 
money. R. 125. And on September 22, 1987f he tendered his per-
formance1^ and filed this action to specifically enforce the 
Agreement, thereby electing his remedy. See, e.g., Salt Lake 
City v- Industrial Comm'n, 81 Utah 213, 17 P.2d 239, 242-43 
(1932). If Kelley's only options were to waive defects or walk 
away from the deal, he clearly chose not to walk away from the 
deal. One would have to conclude from this evidence that, as a 
1 5
 The sufficiency of Kelley's tender is discussed infra, 
pt. III. 
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matter of law, Kelley waived any defects or was estopped from 
claiming damages for defects.1** 
Leucadia argues that the September 22, 1987, letter 
from Kelley's counsel "was clearly and unequivocally a refusal 
to waive title defects." Brief of Respondent at 12. But the 
September 22 letter must be read in conjunction with First 
Security's letters of September 4 and September 17, which prompted 
the September 22 letter. The fact that Kelley asked First 
Security to deliver the property free from those defects it had 
undertaken to cure and to resolve the issue of water rights does 
not mean that Kelley refused to waive those defects. It merely 
means that he refused to waive them based solely on First 
Security's unilateral (and erroneous) assertion that it had no 
obligation under the contract to try to resolve the problems. 
III. 
KELLEY'S TENDER OF PERFORMANCE WAS NOT DEFECTIVE. 
Leucadia next argues that Kelley's failure to make an 
unconditional tender of performance precludes specific perfor-
mance. It claims that Kelley's tender was defective because it 
was conditioned on First Security undertaking obligations that 
16 ffhe proper response for First Security would then 
have been to ask the court to deny Kelley's claim for damages. 
But it did not. Instead, after the trial court granted Kelley 
specific performance and reserved the question of damages, First 
Security settled Kelley's damage claim, thereby mooting any ques-
tion of whether Kelley was entitled to both specific performance 
and damages. 
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were not required by the Agreement. In fact, Kelley's tender 
letter states, "This tender is conditioned only upon First 
Security honoring its obligations pursuant to the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement and delivering the property free from those de-
fects which it has undertaken to cure." R. 61 (emphasis added). 
A tender conditioned only on the other party keeping its part 
of the deal does not make a tender defective. See, e.g., Kodiak 
Island Borough v. Large. 622 P.2d 440, 448 (Alaska 1981); Burke 
Aviation Corp. v. Alton Jennings Co., 377 P.2d 578, 581 (Okla. 
1962); Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Smith, 637 P.2d 1020, 1023 
(Wyo. 1981). 
Leucadia claims that Kelley had no right to insist 
that First Security deliver title to the property free from the 
defects it had undertaken to cure because the Agreement did not 
set forth such an obligation. Similarly, Leucadia suggests that 
Kelley had no right under the Agreement to insist that First 
Security remedy any property damage caused by vandalism.17 But 
17
 Paragraph P of the Agreement states: 
All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be 
borne by the Seller until closing. In the event there 
is loss or damage to the property between the date 
hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fire, 
vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God, and the 
cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percent 
(10%) of the purchase price of the property, Buyer 
may, at his option either proceed with this transaction 
if Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace damaged 
property prior to closing, or declare this Agreement 
null and void. If damage to property is less than 
- 17 -
a contracting party has obligations in addition to those expressly 
set forth in the contract. An obligation of good faith and fair 
dealing "adheres in every contractual relation." Leiah Furniture 
& Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 306 (Utah 1982). First 
Security's express contractual obligation to "furnish good and 
marketable title" carried with it the implied obligation to clear 
the title if it could be done by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence. Lanaston v. Huff acker, 36 Wash. App. 779, 678 P.2d 1265, 
1271 (1984); Ace Realty, Inc. v. Loonev, 531 P.2d 1377, 1380 
(Okla. 1974). Similarly, First Security had an implied con-
tractual obligation to act in good faith to try to remedy any 
property damage. 
Before the provisions of paragraph H and P could apply, 
First Security was required to show that it had met its implied 
ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller 
agrees in writing to repair or replace and does actually 
repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, 
this transaction shall proceed as agreed. 
R. 17. Leucadia admits that paragraph P "does not clearly state 
the remedy available to a purchaser in the event the seller re-
fuses to repair or replace property damage caused by vandalism." 
Brief of Respondent at 12 n.3. Leucadia claims, however, that 
"the only reasonable interpretation of the Paragraph is that 
the Agreement terminates unless the purchaser waives property 
damage claims." id. In other words, under "the only reasonable 
interpretation" of paragraph P, even though the seller bears 
all risk of loss before closing, simply by not agreeing in 
writing to repair or replace damaged property, the seller can 
avoid the sale or deprive the buyer of any remedy for property 
damage, no matter how minor. Kelley interpreted the Agreement 
differently. 
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1 ihi i i ijd t 11 HI 111 goud iaith and fair dealing, Fi ,r st Security d id 
riot claim that i I fuul iit^t this obligation, II simply claimed 
t ha I i obligat i» i, ' i \\ implied it had 
i * 1111 g a t. i cJ 11 t ( 111 anything about any property damage. The 
"condition" that Kelley placed ender merf 
he did not accept ,^ r riad no obli-
inn i-n anything about the title problems and vandalism, 
r was Kelley required 1 - .->- First Seem 
n 11 11 b ,- 11 11ii11 1 1 1 1 1 i i .greement. See, e.a. , Ace 
Realty, Inc. v. Looney, 531 t . *• : . - (Okla. 1974 
Farm Co. v. Cremer, 152 touiiu. 
KELLEY#S TENDER OF PERFORMANCE WAS EXCUSED. 
Kelley has argued that any alleged defect in his tender 
is irrelevant because his t.endei w-'is excLise'i Trie i,au is clear 
11i.n , where a contract contemplates simultaneous performance by 
both parties, such as a contract - , 
neit hei |-i,ui \ i I . i i i . * . party has tendered 
his performance. Century 21 All Western Real Estate & Investment, 
Inc. v. Webb. 645 P.2d ). 
Fir^
 )r0perjy tendered its performance and in 
fact repudiated its obligations under the Agreement, thereby 
excusing Kelley's tender. 
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Leucadia argues that First Security's tender was not 
required because First Security was not the one seeking to enforce 
the Agreement, Kelley was. Yet Leucadia claims that First 
Security's September 4 letter required Kelley to elect between 
waiving defects or walking away from the deal. So under Leu-
cadia's own theory, by trying to trigger Kelley's alleged duty 
to elect, First Security was trying to enforce the Agreement, 
that is, to cause its alleged election of remedy provision to 
take effect, 
Leucadia also argues that First Security did not re-
pudiate its obligations under the Agreement because the Agreement 
did not expressly require First Security to clear title. But 
the contractual obligation to convey clear title carries with 
it the implied obligation to clear title if it can be done in 
the exercise of reasonable diligence. Ace Realty, Inc. v. Loonev, 
531 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Okla. 1975); Lanaston v. Huffacker, 36 Wash. 
App. 779, 678 P.2d 1265, 1271 (1984).18 Leucadia tries to dis-
tinguish Lanaston on the grounds that the court "essentially con-
cluded" that the seller had acted in bad faith in not clearing 
title* Brief of Respondent at 28. In fact, the trial court in 
1 8
 First Security never claimed it had met its obligation. 
It claimed it had no obligation and was simply not interested 
in pursuing the Armstrong action. First Security's lack of in-
terest at best constituted subjective impossibility, which did 
not excuse it from conveying clear title. Carcione v. Clark. 
96 Nev. 808, 618 P.2d 346, 348 (1980). 
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that case made - • lure of the sa 1 e to 
I InhH b")" i he closing date was t lie fault of the closing agent 
If there were fault" and not the fault ct the FIJ 
P.2d - The Waf.li i I'IIJ! ., HI (,'uurl ct Appeals did not disturb 
.actual finding, but rejected the trial court's conclusion 
that any fault ol, the closing agent was m t «:u » • IIHII^I c » »• «• 
seller. Th^ . -, i . al court's 
"unchallenged inding^ i r vt established that "diligent atten-
" :\ i ^ •• seller] t ^ > <».« * . . . 
have made transaction" * : tie closing 
date .M 1271; see also id. 268. Thus, Lanaston was 
decided iinu, were 
because First Security never claimed that 
it, hdtl satisfied its duty Lo clear title; it simply » IrumncJ it 
had no o^^, 
C act?, this ;ast " itiin li closer to Ace Realty, 
which Leucadia has . - * nauish . --t 
case failec eed necessary to clear tc^e. 
The cour* - seller's failure to obtain the quitclaim 
deed did not excuse his obligation ; |ic limlc I li. Lmyet from 
obtain I imance. The court noted that the seller 
based . actions "not on the ground of inability, but upon I he 
. * : ,;. court also made a finding of fact that the 
seller's title could have been cleared by the closing date. 
678 P.2d at 1269. 
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contention that the purchaser had lost the right to enforce the 
contract." 531 P.2d at 1380- Similarly, in this case, First 
Security did not claim it was unable to clear title but simply 
that it had no obligation to do so. The Oklahoma court rejected 
such an argument, noting that it "would give the vendor the poten-
tial right and power to take advantage of his own wrong." Id. 
at 1381. By the same token, First Security should not have been 
the final arbiter of its obligations under the Agreement. Kelley 
was entitled to ask a court whether First Security had an obli-
gation to try to clear title and whether or not it had complied 
with its obligations under the Agreement. 
Leucadia also argues that there was no indication that 
First Security was the cause of the problems or acted in bad 
faith and that, in fact, First Security did exercise reasonable 
diligence to clear title and was unable to do so. On the other 
hand, there was no evidence that First Security had exercised 
reasonable diligence to clear title and was unable to do so. 
The only evidence was that First Security had undertaken an action 
to correct the problems and then decided it was "no longer desi-
rous" of pursuing the action. First Security did not claim that 
it had exercised reasonable diligence to clear title; it simply 
claimed it never had any obligation to try to clear title. In 
other words, it repudiated its implied contractual obligation 
of good faith and fair dealing, thereby excusing Kelley's tender. 
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See . ^-ii,,, Reed v. Alvev "* n o ^ (Utah 1980); Huck 
v. Haves, 560 P.2d 1124, 1126 (Utah 197* 
Finally, Leucadia argues tender 
required to make an election and that 
the September 22 letter showed he elected to refuse tu 
title defects. Apart from was no evidence 
Lieged duty -....,. ever arose, see supra pt. 
II, that, argument ignores the fact that, the same day1 Kfj i "-'y t:: 
counsel sent the lettei 1 11 > M M M I M M * riction asking the 
declare the parties' rights and obligations under the 
Agreemer \ --;-. \ i enforce the Agreement acc^ 
By filing i.,., r < r " • i • M I I"1 • 1 I * ,» ,. lectior elected not 
* terminate the Agreement but enforce ^* f * >„e 
court—not First Security- ' s.-- rov.cicn 
( M M I'I in 1 | p i 11 i H J 1111 J* J i y Security relied required Kelley 
to waive? title defects before enforcing the Agreement. 
V. 
KELLEY WAS ENTITLED TO A REASONABLE TIME WITHIN 
WHICH TO PERFORM, AND HE TENDERED HIS PERFORMANCE 
WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME, 
Leucadia claims that the "time of » in . • i nu . I .ise 
of the Agreement r>»ns**H fhi..» "qreemeni. t.o terminate Dy its own 
Lfcjiiu. ri September 22, 1987, precluding specific performance. 
That provision states: 
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In the event that this sale cannot be 
closed by the date provided herein due to 
interruption of transport, strikes, fire, 
flood, extreme weather, governmental regu-
lations, acts of God, or similar occurrences 
beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then 
the closing date shall be extended seven 
(7) days beyond cessation of such condition, 
but in no event more than thirty (30) days 
beyond the closing date provided herein. 
Thereafter, time is of the essence. This 
provision relates only to the extension of 
closing date. "Closing" shall mean the date 
on which all necessary instruments are signed 
and delivered by all parties to the trans-
action. 
R. 17 1 Q. 
Paragraph Q makes time of the essence only after there 
has been a delay in closing due to some force majeure. There 
was no such occurrence in this case. Therefore, the "time is 
of the essence" provision did not apply. 
Even if the Agreement made time of the essence, the 
parties waived that requirement by their conduct. They repeatedly 
extended the closing date, twice after it had already expired. 
Even First Security did not treat the Agreement as if it had 
expired on August 31, 1987, the last agreed closing date. Under 
these circumstances, any requirement that time was of the essence 
was waived. E.g. . Huck v. Haves, 560 P.2d 1124, 1126 (Utah 1977); 
Schwoyer v. Fenstermacher, 251 Pa. Super. 243, 380 A.2d 468, 
470 (1977); Cline v. Hullum, 435 P.2d 152, 156 (Okla. 1967). 
The contract therefore continued in effect. Century 21 All 
Western Real Estate & Investment, Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52, 55 
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(Utah 19b First Security could thereafter make time of tl le 
essence, but - - required to give Kelley reasonable time 
with: Eorm Tanner v. Baadscraard, i 1 2 if: '.2d 34 5, 
uid the evidence was undisputed that September 
1987, did not give Kelley a reasonable time. See i« >7 8-
Leucadia argues that First Security's repeated exten-
sions ol the closing date (twice aftci 1 he* ilat < i prisscm n u m 
essence provisions el; the Agreement. 
Even .i argument were correc * i r- Security still waived 
* *e time - *»~ essence provisi > •;. .; * 
security recognized, before Kelley could make 
an informed decision with respect \n t ht-- property, he needed 
1 • r r s u i i v* Hi i '"O'ltisp I r*l"»w! I I" I ""iir l.i i y jncl water problems, 
} Despite First Security s offer to cooperate with 
Kelley's counsel, id* ndisputed that First Seen 
t< : » kee- the problems with Kelley's 
counsel not give Kelley's counsel all the documents he 
needed * evaluate the problems unti , 
we] ] d i laterally imposed deadline .. September 22, 
1987. Tl" the Agreement did not expire on September 22, 1987, 
as Leucadia claims. 
Finally, even I f September 22, 3 987, were the bewitching 
hour, Kelley took appropriate action on September 22, 1987: He 
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tendered his performance (conditioned only on First Security 
fulfilling its part of the deal),20
 anci he filed this action 
to enforce the Agreement according to its terms. 
VI. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DIRECTING THAT 
JUDGMENT BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF LEUCADIA. 
Leucadia argues that the court of appeals properly 
directed that judgment be entered for Leucadia because there 
were no factual disputes to be resolved on remand. Kelley agrees 
that there were no factual disputes before the trial court that 
would have precluded summary judgment for Kelley. But the court 
of appeals reversed that summary judgment based on a contract 
provision that was never raised in the trial court. If the court 
of appeals properly decided the appeal based on paragraph H, 
then there existed disputed factual issues that precluded entry 
of judgment in favor of Leucadia. 
Leucadia claims that there was no factual dispute that 
title was not insurable. In fact, there was no evidence with 
respect to title insurance at all—no preliminary commitment, 
2 0
 As shown supra, pt. Ill, Kelley's tender was not defec-
tive because conditional. The only "condition" he imposed was 
that First Security comply with its obligations under the Agree-
ment. It was only because First Security insisted it had no 
obligation that Kelley had to file this action. 
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s
 * le insurance policy and no ALTA standard f i rn. £l See supra 
reason alone, the court of appeals erred in 
directing judgment for Leucadia. 
Leucadia also claims that LIUM *•  *MI, I i |uest. ion ' 
i'»•'llt>y f *' i LIM 'i I i waive title defects. Waiver is generall; 
question of fact or at least a mixed question of law and fact. 
See Loftis v. Pacific Mut, Lite Ins , Cu, . J'« I" >Ii "''IP1, V ', «l 
"
IJ|
 I "' 9 1 I ) . The only evidence was that Kelley refused 
to walk away from the dea. *• accept First Security's assertion 
that it ii 
That *c ^ mut- ai , refuse. f title defects 
Kellev were required r< waive * defects 
t'v i IIHIICM li)f:«!, oi f-,» I In-1 i J in ill 'L"uu o w a e X , * evidence 
no whether or not he refused t. -*<: defects was at best am-
biguous, precluding judgment for liem "rut i -n, 
Finally, by deciding the appeal based on a contract 
provision not raised below, the court of appeals deprived Kelley 
of a n " opportuni * " » ••oSf«nf defenses il i .in n|i 11• I ill lor e x a m -
p lie, First Security waived oi was estopped from 
relying :he provisions of paragraph 11, which would also have 
presented fac 
a Title could be insurable if, for example, there was a 
title I nsurance company that was wi 11 i ng to insure over any pro-
blem. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court 
of appeals should be reversed and the judgment of the district 
court affirmed. 
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